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Can corrupt politicians be redeemed by competence? Credit: Anthony Goto; CC by 2.0
The Brazilian experience shows that voters are more forgiving
of incompetence than they are of corruption
Corruption in the U.S. is perceived as being on the rise, with research showing that voters are
increasingly concerned about the relationship between private financial interests and politicians.
But are voters willing to forgive corrupt politicians if they are competent? New research which
looks at the Brazilian case by Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro and Matthew S. Winters shows that
voters are merciless when it comes to forgiving corrupt officials and politicians, and that their
electoral success is usually a result of lower voter information.
At the end of June 2013, over one million people took to the streets in cities across Brazil.
Protests that had begun in the city of São Paulo in reaction to mass transit fare hikes had
become a nationwide movement and had taken on a number of additional concerns, such as the
overall cost of living in Brazil, substandard provision of social services, police brutality, and
corruption. In a survey that we ran in July 2013, over half of our respondents described
corruption as one of the main reasons for the protests, and one in five said that it was the main
reason (second only to the fare increases).
Corruption is big business in Brazil, costing the country between 1.4 and 2.3 percent of its total
GDP, according to a 2010 study by FIESP, the Federation of Industries of São Paulo State.
Corruption is alleged to be one of the reasons why stadium construction and other infrastructure projects related
to the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics have lagged behind and experienced severe cost
overruns. The 2005 Mensalão scandal – in which the ruling Worker’s Party (PT) made payments to national
legislators to guarantee their votes – demonstrated that corruption affects the highest levels of government in
Brazil.
Persistent political corruption in a
democracy necessarily means that
voters are choosing to put corrupt
politicians in office. And despite the anti-
corruption message of the 2013
protests, a piece of conventional
wisdom in Brazil for many years has
been that they willingly do so, opting to
support corrupt politicians because
those politicians are otherwise
performing well. “Rouba, mas faz,” in
Portuguese: “He robs, but he gets
things done.”
In ongoing research that we began in
the summer of 2010, we set out to see
whether Brazilian voters really thought
this way, being willing to trade-off some
political corruption in exchange for good
performance in other areas. In focus
group discussions, people would tell us that the attitude was widespread but that they themselves did not condone
it. And while three-quarters of our 2010 survey respondents thought that it was somewhat or very common for
politicians to take bribes, an even larger proportion said that they themselves had never personally voted for a
corrupt politician. Very few people were willing to admit to personally accepting political corruption.
Since people will often obscure their true feelings when asked directly in a survey question, we also included an
experiment in our survey, the results of which have been published in the journal Comparative Politics. Each
survey respondent heard about a mayor running for reelection. We described the mayor either as corrupt or not
corrupt, and we also described the mayor as either having provided many public works to his city or few public
works. We then asked our respondents whether or not they thought that someone like them would vote to reelect
the mayor.
If a widespread “ rouba, mas faz” attitude exists in Brazil, then our surveys should have revealed that many people
would be more likely to reelect a corrupt mayor when that mayor had provided many public goods. Instead we
found that information about good performance in the realm of public goods provision only slightly offset the
corruption information.
Whereas 78 percent of respondents supported reelecting a mayor who was free from corruption charges
(regardless of the level of public goods provision), only 19 percent were willing to support a corrupt mayor – a
difference of 58 percentage points! Among clean mayors, good public works provision increased their popularity
among our respondents by 26 percentage points, whereas good public works provision redeemed corrupt mayors
to a lesser extent: their reelection chances increased by only 15 percentage points. Voters react sufficiently
strongly to corruption that our clean but incompetent mayor was supported by 62 percent of the respondents who
heard about him, while our corrupt but competent mayor garnered support from only 28 percent of those
surveyed.
This willingness to withdraw support from corrupt politicians suggests to us that corrupt politicians get elected in
Brazil not because voters are willing to trade-off corruption for performance but rather because they lack
information about the corrupt behavior of politicians. Our individual-level survey data therefore underpins a finding
by economists Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan. In a 2008 article. those authors found that the revelation of
corruption in advance of an election led to sharp reductions in re-election rates for mayors in comparison with
equally-corrupt mayors where the corruption was revealed only after the election and therefore at too late a point
in time for voters to act on the information. Since working harder to reveal corruption is something more easily
done than convincing people to change the way that they view corruption, this is a positive result from the
perspective of combatting political corruption in Brazil.
For this reason, we are optimistic about anti-corruption campaigns in Brazil. The federal government audits of
municipalities that are studied by Ferraz and Finan have been one way in which local-level corruption has been
revealed. And new survey work that we conducted in May 2013 demonstrates that citizens believe these federal
audits to be a credible source of information.
Beyond electoral decisions by voters, in reaction to the protests, the Brazilian senate finally passed – after a
three-year delay – a law increasing the penalties for corruption. The country’s Supreme Court also upheld
convictions of those implicated in the Mensalão scandal. These types of anti-corruption efforts in the law and
justice sector are equally important to the voting behaviour that we study. And the fact that the new law and the
Supreme Court ruling come in the wake of the protests might suggest that unconventional political participation
can help bring about the anti-corruption initiatives that are necessarily in the hands of the government and not
voters.
If our survey offers one point of caution, however, it was a finding with regard to our upper-class respondents.
Surprisingly – and again in contrast to conventional wisdom – insofar as we found a group of people willing to
condone corruption when a politician was otherwise performing well, it was among the upper class. Whereas
clean if incompetent mayors were preferred by 34 percentage points to corrupt but competent mayors among our
overall sample, among our upper class respondents, the advantage was only six percentage points, which was
not statistically distinguishable from zero.
Given that members of the upper class have more influence over the media and over government decision
making in times of normal politics, this evidence for a “rouba, mas faz” attitude among this group gives us some
cause for concern. Yet it is important to note that our sample of upper-class respondents was fairly small – 110
respondents out of an overall sample of 2,002 Brazilians – which means that this result in particular calls for
reexamination in future surveys.
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